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EU Crypto-Asset Framework — Public Consultation Response
Publisher's note — May 2026
This document is the verbatim substantive content of a public consultation response submitted to the European Commission on 13 March 2020 (Contribution ID: 03a8d562-ea17-4120-a92a-ef1781e99f06), formatted for readability. The positions argued here — on the inadequacy of CSDR for DLT environments, on Liechtenstein's TVTG as a model for token property law, on the monetary sovereignty risks of global stablecoins, and on the need for harmonised civil law for token transfers — have since been confirmed by market and regulatory developments. Published as a matter of record alongside the 2026 MiDA article and the formal response to the MiCA review consultation.
The response covers: token taxonomy and why function-based classification fails; the CSDR's structural incompatibility with DLT settlement; Liechtenstein's TVTG as the model for EU token property law; stablecoin risks including monetary sovereignty and the case for a digital euro settlement asset; the need for civil law harmonisation for token transfers; and CSD and settlement finality framework reform. Submitted as an individual response in a professional capacity.
01 — Token Classification
Q8 — Classification
Should any EU classification of crypto-assets distinguish between payment tokens, investment tokens, utility tokens and hybrid tokens?
Classification by function produces an unbounded hybrid category. The moment a token serves more than one purpose — as most do — it escapes clean classification. A taxonomy based on the legal rights attached to the token is more durable: it does not depend on how an issuer characterises intended use, and it does not shift as market usage evolves.
Q9 — Deposits
Would you see any crypto-asset which could qualify as a deposit within the meaning of Article 2(3) DGSD?
02 — Stablecoins and Monetary Sovereignty
Q12 — Benefits
What are the benefits of stablecoins and global stablecoins?
Global stablecoins will be voted on by consumers in terms of convenience, cost of transfer, and international acceptance. I could well imagine a global stablecoin exhibiting properties along the lines of the Special Drawing Right issued by the IMF — representing a more or less static basket of the most common international currencies.
Q13 — Risks
What are the most important risks related to stablecoins?
The efficacy of national monetary policy measures will diminish as stablecoin diversification effects grow on a global level.
This was written in March 2020, before the GENIUS Act, before USDT surpassed $130 billion in circulation, and before Tether became one of the most profitable financial entities on earth — extracting yield from US Treasury reserves that no token holder receives. The monetary sovereignty concern was real. The policy response — the interest prohibition in MiCA — addressed the symptom and not the cause.
03 — National Regimes and Liechtenstein's TVTG
Q15 — National regimes
What is your experience as regards national regimes on crypto-assets? Which measures are effective, which are not?
Q16 — Proportionality
How would it be possible to ensure that a bespoke regime for crypto-assets is proportionate to induce innovation while protecting users?
The Liechtenstein Token and Trusted Technology Service Providers Act (TVTG) entered into force in 2020. It defines a token as a legal container for rights stemming from an underlying asset — transfer of the token is legally valid transfer of the rights, with full third-party effect. It has operated continuously since then. The EU has had six years to observe a working proof of concept in an EEA member state. The recommendation made here in 2020 was not followed in MiCA's design. It remains the right answer for MiDA.
04 — Civil Law Harmonisation
Q18 — Harmonisation
Should harmonisation of national civil laws be considered to provide clarity on the legal validity of token transfers and the tokenisation of assets?
This is the 28th regime argument. A functional approach to token property law — specifying the legal consequences of ledger entries without requiring harmonisation of all underlying national property law — is the only instrument that produces cross-border enforceability. The political opposition is real and was real in 2020. It remains the correct position.
05 — DLT and the CSDR
Q88 / Q88.2 — CSDR compatibility
Would you see any particular issue with applying CSDR definitions in a DLT environment?
What we need is a clear definition of roles and functions of a DLT environment and how this (a) fits into CSDR or (b) what changes or new regulation is necessary. In my view a public key cannot qualify as an account in a settlement system under CSDR for as long as wallets are not kept with a licensed institution. See the Liechtenstein blockchain act for inclusion of dematerialised rights in the context of blockchain. The cash leg could be settled on-chain provided there is a dedicated stablecoin or digital euro available.
Q89.1 — Book-entry requirements
Do you consider that the book-entry requirements under CSDR are compatible with security tokens?
Q91.1 — Other DLT issues
Is there any other particular issue with applying the current rules in a DLT environment?
— Lack of harmonised law concept regarding dematerialisation of securities
— Current form of CSDR not ideal for exploiting the full benefits of DLT
See the DLT trading venue as intended to enter into force in Switzerland as a good basis.
We need a complete new CSD definition to exploit the full potential of securities on the blockchain.
Europe currently operates 32 CSDs. The US operates one. Settlement costs in Europe run 65% higher than North America. The CSDR overhaul recommended here in 2020 did not materialise. The DLT Pilot Regime arrived instead — a sandbox that leaves the underlying CSD architecture intact. MiDA is the next opportunity to address the structural problem rather than work around it.
06 — Token Property Law and Conflicts of Law
Q92 — Transfer of ownership
Does your national law set out requirements regarding the transfer of ownership in a DLT environment?
Q93.1 — Settlement Finality Directive
Is there any other particular issue with applying the Settlement Finality Directive definitions in a DLT environment?
Q94 — Conflicts of law
Would there be a need for clarification of conflict of laws rules when applying these rules in a DLT network?
International cooperation in a digital token world is very important — or the other way round: if there is no cooperation, the jurisdiction with the most favourable or convenient law will attract the large portion of global token offerings and issuers.
That last observation has since proved correct. Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and the UAE attracted the most sophisticated token issuers precisely because they offered legal certainty that EU member states could not provide. The race to the most favourable jurisdiction was entirely predictable in 2020. It has materialised exactly as predicted.
07 — Prospectus, Disclosure, and Token Identification
Q83.1 — Smart contract disclosures
Should Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 include specific schedules for security tokens? What additional smart contract disclosures are needed?
— Which standard the smart contract is built upon (Ethereum, Corda, etc.)
— What are the costs for a transfer (e.g. gas fees on the Ethereum blockchain)
— Has there been a software audit of the smart contract
— Are there any features to alter token parameters post-deployment
— Is there a limitation of transferability (e.g. from a whitelist)
— Is there a mechanism in case private keys have been lost by individual investors
— Will tax reporting occur at the level of the smart contract
The lost private key question — flagged here in 2020 as a disclosure item — is in fact a structural legal problem that no EU framework has yet addressed. If tokens are permanently inaccessible, no majority acquirer can ever reach 100% ownership. Squeezeout provisions, compulsory acquisition thresholds, and minority buy-out procedures all assume traceable minority holders. They are silent on irrecoverable token positions. This is a gap MiDA must fill.
Q84 — Token identification
Do you identify any issues in obtaining an ISIN for issuing a security token?
Q86 — Prospectus alleviation
Should an ad hoc alleviated prospectus type be introduced for security tokens?
08 — Settlement Finality and DLT Clearing
Q101 — Central clearing
Do you think that security tokens are suitable for central clearing?
Q88.2 — Delivery-versus-payment
What could constitute delivery-versus-payment in a DLT network?
The digital euro and Pontes — the ECB's connection of DLT platforms to TARGET Services — are the answer to this question, six years later. The architecture was clear in 2020. The infrastructure is only now arriving.
— Six Positions. Six Years. The Verdict.
Positions argued in March 2020 — status in May 2026
- Q15 — Liechtenstein TVTG as the model for EU token property law. Not followed in MiCA. Remains the right answer for MiDA. The EU has had six years to observe a working proof of concept in an EEA member state.
- Q13 — Global stablecoins will erode monetary policy efficacy through diversification effects. USDT at $130bn+ confirms the concern. The MiCA interest prohibition addressed the symptom, not the cause. Tether's estimated 2024 net profit of ~$13 billion was an unintended consequence.
- Q88 — CSDR requires a complete overhaul for DLT environments. The DLT Pilot Regime arrived instead. The 32-CSD architecture remains. The structural problem has not been addressed.
- Q18 — Harmonisation of national civil laws governing token transfers is unavoidable. Still unresolved. The MiDA consultation is the next and possibly last opportunity before national positions calcify.
- Q88.2 — DLT cash-leg settlement requires a dedicated stablecoin or digital euro. Pontes connects DLT platforms to TARGET Services from Q3 2026. The architecture was clear in 2020. The infrastructure arrives six years later.
- Q94 — Without international cooperation, issuers will concentrate in the most favourable jurisdiction. Confirmed. Liechtenstein, Switzerland, UAE, and Singapore attracted what the EU could not retain.
- Q83.1 — Lost private keys require a legal mechanism in the prospectus and in squeezeout law. No EU framework has addressed this. It remains an open structural problem for tokenised equity.
This document is the verbatim substantive content of a public consultation response submitted to the European Commission on 13 March 2020. Contribution ID: 03a8d562-ea17-4120-a92a-ef1781e99f06. Published here in May 2026 as a matter of record. The views expressed are the analytical position of the author at the time of submission and do not constitute legal or regulatory advice.