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EU Crypto-Asset Framework — Public Consultation Response

Julian Gretzinger  ·  13 March 2020  ·  Substack

Publisher's note — May 2026

This document is the verbatim substantive content of a public consultation response submitted to the European Commission on 13 March 2020 (Contribution ID: 03a8d562-ea17-4120-a92a-ef1781e99f06), formatted for readability. The positions argued here — on the inadequacy of CSDR for DLT environments, on Liechtenstein's TVTG as a model for token property law, on the monetary sovereignty risks of global stablecoins, and on the need for harmonised civil law for token transfers — have since been confirmed by market and regulatory developments. Published as a matter of record alongside the 2026 MiDA article and the formal response to the MiCA review consultation.

The response covers: token taxonomy and why function-based classification fails; the CSDR's structural incompatibility with DLT settlement; Liechtenstein's TVTG as the model for EU token property law; stablecoin risks including monetary sovereignty and the case for a digital euro settlement asset; the need for civil law harmonisation for token transfers; and CSD and settlement finality framework reform. Submitted as an individual response in a professional capacity.

Six positions. Six years. The verdict scorecard is at the end of this document.

#MiCA#DLT#stablecoins#CSDR#TVTG#tokenisation

01 — Token Classification

Q8 — Classification

Should any EU classification of crypto-assets distinguish between payment tokens, investment tokens, utility tokens and hybrid tokens?

Payment, investment, utility and hybrid token do not provide a framework for clear differentiation. A large set of tokens would likely qualify as "hybrid." Usage is not the appropriate method to differentiate. The taxonomy approach per Question 7 — based on the rights attached to the token rather than its intended use — is significantly more appropriate.

Classification by function produces an unbounded hybrid category. The moment a token serves more than one purpose — as most do — it escapes clean classification. A taxonomy based on the legal rights attached to the token is more durable: it does not depend on how an issuer characterises intended use, and it does not shift as market usage evolves.

Q9 — Deposits

Would you see any crypto-asset which could qualify as a deposit within the meaning of Article 2(3) DGSD?

Crypto-assets which qualify as financial instruments or transferable securities can be excluded from qualifying as "deposit." All other tokens could in principle qualify as deposit, provided they are accepted as such by banks — booked on-balance sheet with an obligation to be returned upon notice of the client — and thus covered by DGSD.

02 — Stablecoins and Monetary Sovereignty

Q12 — Benefits

What are the benefits of stablecoins and global stablecoins?

Dealing in the digital world needs a completely digitalised currency — a stablecoin. Settling transactions in tokens within minutes does not deliver the expected benefits if payment does not occur within the same timeframe. Blockchain technology allows for delivery-versus-payment built into the code of the smart contract; without a properly regulated token currency this technological enhancement is literally useless. Stablecoins allow for easier use of payment and currency conversion under increased competition and transparency.

Global stablecoins will be voted on by consumers in terms of convenience, cost of transfer, and international acceptance. I could well imagine a global stablecoin exhibiting properties along the lines of the Special Drawing Right issued by the IMF — representing a more or less static basket of the most common international currencies.

Q13 — Risks

What are the most important risks related to stablecoins?

Stablecoins and especially global stablecoins might impact financial stability and monetary sovereignty severely. Personally, I expect a tendency towards global stablecoins constructed like an index basket — with limited efficacy of national monetary policy measures because of a diminishing partial impact due to the diversification effect on a global level.
The efficacy of national monetary policy measures will diminish as stablecoin diversification effects grow on a global level.

This was written in March 2020, before the GENIUS Act, before USDT surpassed $130 billion in circulation, and before Tether became one of the most profitable financial entities on earth — extracting yield from US Treasury reserves that no token holder receives. The monetary sovereignty concern was real. The policy response — the interest prohibition in MiCA — addressed the symptom and not the cause.

03 — National Regimes and Liechtenstein's TVTG

Q15 — National regimes

What is your experience as regards national regimes on crypto-assets? Which measures are effective, which are not?

I would recommend taking a closer look at the Liechtenstein "blockchain act," which tries to provide an overarching law for literally all sorts of token. Trying to regulate or provide a legal basis only partially will — in my opinion — lead to more new questions than it tried to solve in the first place.

Q16 — Proportionality

How would it be possible to ensure that a bespoke regime for crypto-assets is proportionate to induce innovation while protecting users?

I again recommend taking a closer look at the Liechtenstein solution. Working with a registration and a moderate capital requirement for "business starters" might provide a proportionate solution.

The Liechtenstein Token and Trusted Technology Service Providers Act (TVTG) entered into force in 2020. It defines a token as a legal container for rights stemming from an underlying asset — transfer of the token is legally valid transfer of the rights, with full third-party effect. It has operated continuously since then. The EU has had six years to observe a working proof of concept in an EEA member state. The recommendation made here in 2020 was not followed in MiCA's design. It remains the right answer for MiDA.

04 — Civil Law Harmonisation

Q18 — Harmonisation

Should harmonisation of national civil laws be considered to provide clarity on the legal validity of token transfers and the tokenisation of assets?

Unfortunately, I do not see another solution than a harmonisation of national civil laws — with all the opposition which can be expected in such a "serious interference."

This is the 28th regime argument. A functional approach to token property law — specifying the legal consequences of ledger entries without requiring harmonisation of all underlying national property law — is the only instrument that produces cross-border enforceability. The political opposition is real and was real in 2020. It remains the correct position.

05 — DLT and the CSDR

Q88 / Q88.2 — CSDR compatibility

Would you see any particular issue with applying CSDR definitions in a DLT environment?

CSD function as per CSDR is not appropriate in a DLT environment. I would suggest a dedicated overhaul of the CSDR.

What we need is a clear definition of roles and functions of a DLT environment and how this (a) fits into CSDR or (b) what changes or new regulation is necessary. In my view a public key cannot qualify as an account in a settlement system under CSDR for as long as wallets are not kept with a licensed institution. See the Liechtenstein blockchain act for inclusion of dematerialised rights in the context of blockchain. The cash leg could be settled on-chain provided there is a dedicated stablecoin or digital euro available.

Q89.1 — Book-entry requirements

Do you consider that the book-entry requirements under CSDR are compatible with security tokens?

Not all member states have a legal basis for an alternative. We need a harmonised framework for dematerialised securities in Europe, and on that basis one can think of which basic functions a CSD should take over in a DLT environment. I could also think of DLT exchanges as providing the notary function of a CSD. All in all we need a complete new CSD definition to exploit the full potential of securities on the blockchain.

Q91.1 — Other DLT issues

Is there any other particular issue with applying the current rules in a DLT environment?

— Definitions and taxonomy
— Lack of harmonised law concept regarding dematerialisation of securities
— Current form of CSDR not ideal for exploiting the full benefits of DLT

See the DLT trading venue as intended to enter into force in Switzerland as a good basis.
We need a complete new CSD definition to exploit the full potential of securities on the blockchain.

Europe currently operates 32 CSDs. The US operates one. Settlement costs in Europe run 65% higher than North America. The CSDR overhaul recommended here in 2020 did not materialise. The DLT Pilot Regime arrived instead — a sandbox that leaves the underlying CSD architecture intact. MiDA is the next opportunity to address the structural problem rather than work around it.

06 — Token Property Law and Conflicts of Law

Q92 — Transfer of ownership

Does your national law set out requirements regarding the transfer of ownership in a DLT environment?

See Liechtenstein blockchain act. All tokens qualify as dematerialised rights, with a register of rights able to be kept on the blockchain. Transfer of ownership is legally valid by transferring the token.

Q93.1 — Settlement Finality Directive

Is there any other particular issue with applying the Settlement Finality Directive definitions in a DLT environment?

The legal and regulatory framework should be designed on the basis of the best suitable market infrastructure for tokens — not by applying existing concepts to a new technology.

Q94 — Conflicts of law

Would there be a need for clarification of conflict of laws rules when applying these rules in a DLT network?

In the case of security tokens, the relevant law will likely be that of the issuer's domicile, if the offering is not conducted intentionally in another jurisdiction. Personally I think we have not all made up our minds what holding a share of a foreign entity in our securities account effectively means in the light of our home jurisdiction.

International cooperation in a digital token world is very important — or the other way round: if there is no cooperation, the jurisdiction with the most favourable or convenient law will attract the large portion of global token offerings and issuers.

That last observation has since proved correct. Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and the UAE attracted the most sophisticated token issuers precisely because they offered legal certainty that EU member states could not provide. The race to the most favourable jurisdiction was entirely predictable in 2020. It has materialised exactly as predicted.

07 — Prospectus, Disclosure, and Token Identification

Q83.1 — Smart contract disclosures

Should Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980 include specific schedules for security tokens? What additional smart contract disclosures are needed?

Additional information about the smart contract and related risks is needed, including:
— Which standard the smart contract is built upon (Ethereum, Corda, etc.)
— What are the costs for a transfer (e.g. gas fees on the Ethereum blockchain)
— Has there been a software audit of the smart contract
— Are there any features to alter token parameters post-deployment
— Is there a limitation of transferability (e.g. from a whitelist)
— Is there a mechanism in case private keys have been lost by individual investors
— Will tax reporting occur at the level of the smart contract

The lost private key question — flagged here in 2020 as a disclosure item — is in fact a structural legal problem that no EU framework has yet addressed. If tokens are permanently inaccessible, no majority acquirer can ever reach 100% ownership. Squeezeout provisions, compulsory acquisition thresholds, and minority buy-out procedures all assume traceable minority holders. They are silent on irrecoverable token positions. This is a gap MiDA must fill.

Q84 — Token identification

Do you identify any issues in obtaining an ISIN for issuing a security token?

A specific numbering or identification along the lines of an ISIN is highly recommended. However, I would not call it ISIN but rather something different. An ISIN for a token might lead an average investor to conclude that the token is also available as an intermediated security in the classical clearing system — which should be the case only for tokens that exhibit that feature.

Q86 — Prospectus alleviation

Should an ad hoc alleviated prospectus type be introduced for security tokens?

Same business, same risks, same rules.

08 — Settlement Finality and DLT Clearing

Q101 — Central clearing

Do you think that security tokens are suitable for central clearing?

Not central clearing as we know it today. Technically, tokens can be cleared "within" a smart contract. The question does not really make sense if the full potential of DLT is to be considered.

Q88.2 — Delivery-versus-payment

What could constitute delivery-versus-payment in a DLT network?

The cash leg could be settled on-chain provided there is a dedicated stablecoin or digital euro available.

The digital euro and Pontes — the ECB's connection of DLT platforms to TARGET Services — are the answer to this question, six years later. The architecture was clear in 2020. The infrastructure is only now arriving.


Six Positions. Six Years. The Verdict.

Positions argued in March 2020 — status in May 2026

  • Q15 — Liechtenstein TVTG as the model for EU token property law. Not followed in MiCA. Remains the right answer for MiDA. The EU has had six years to observe a working proof of concept in an EEA member state.
  • Q13 — Global stablecoins will erode monetary policy efficacy through diversification effects. USDT at $130bn+ confirms the concern. The MiCA interest prohibition addressed the symptom, not the cause. Tether's estimated 2024 net profit of ~$13 billion was an unintended consequence.
  • Q88 — CSDR requires a complete overhaul for DLT environments. The DLT Pilot Regime arrived instead. The 32-CSD architecture remains. The structural problem has not been addressed.
  • Q18 — Harmonisation of national civil laws governing token transfers is unavoidable. Still unresolved. The MiDA consultation is the next and possibly last opportunity before national positions calcify.
  • Q88.2 — DLT cash-leg settlement requires a dedicated stablecoin or digital euro. Pontes connects DLT platforms to TARGET Services from Q3 2026. The architecture was clear in 2020. The infrastructure arrives six years later.
  • Q94 — Without international cooperation, issuers will concentrate in the most favourable jurisdiction. Confirmed. Liechtenstein, Switzerland, UAE, and Singapore attracted what the EU could not retain.
  • Q83.1 — Lost private keys require a legal mechanism in the prospectus and in squeezeout law. No EU framework has addressed this. It remains an open structural problem for tokenised equity.

Julian Gretzinger

Investor and writer on monetary history, real wealth mechanics, and financial markets. substack.com/@juliangretzinger